In Defense Of Bush

Posted on Tue, Jul. 19, 2005 A guest column by James K. Boomer

In defense of Bush and U.S. intervention in Iraq

Bush-haters continue to intensify their anti-Iraq War rancor: President Bush lied about WMD; Iraq is a Vietnam-like quagmire; we need to establish a timetable for withdrawal of our forces; we never should have gone into Iraq, etc. First, many investigations and reports verify that the president did not lie. Second, pre-war intelligence was not all wrong. Third, many politicians who previously stated that there were WMD, and who demanded action in Iraq, are now in denial. They want to blame the president and fraudulently regain their political power.
In his 2003 State of the Union speech, President Bush summarized intelligence verifying Saddam’s intent to accelerate his WMD programs when international inspectors left. Bush did not say that Saddam had a stockpile of WMD, rather that we had verified his plans and infrastructure and could not account for many previously identified WMD items and activities. Furthermore, Bush said that waiting for Saddam’s next move while he continued to ignore 11 years of UN resolutions was not a viable choice.
The following excerpts from the Oct. 6, 2004, Iraq Survey Group (ISG) report to the Senate Intelligence Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee confirm the president’s 2003 State of the Union comments:
“Through an effective procurement network, skilled scientists, and longer-range missile designs, Saddam intended to reconstitute long-range missile systems that were potentially for WMD . . . . Saddam had designs for three 400 to 1,000 kilometer range ballistic missiles; . . . related procurements expanded after the UN inspectors departed in 1998. After Desert Storm, Iraq concealed key elements of its nuclear scientific community. . . . Saddam planned to resume a chemical weapons effort after sanctions were lifted. . . . After the mid-1990s, Iraq maintained its chemical weapons knowledge base, including modest dual-use research, which facilitated a rigorous chemical production capability. Dual-use programs keep ISG from determining the specific connection with chemical weapons. . . . From 1991 to 2003, the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained an undeclared covert network of chemical and poison research and test laboratories. . . . Iraq had a biological warfare scientific know-how cadre, and could have used its dual-use capability for biological warfare capability.”
Ignoring the above ISG report, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction March 31, 2005, report wrongly concludes “the intelligence community was dead wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.”
Why the dichotomy? People who have served on a committee will tell you how difficult it is to achieve unanimous conclusions and statements. In “The Downing Street Years,” Margaret Thatcher notes: “Consensus is the process of abandoning all beliefs, principles, values and policies in search of something in which no one believes, but to which no one objects; the process of avoiding the very issues that have to be solved, merely because you cannot get agreement on the way ahead.” This is particularly true on politically charged issues.
There are terrorism and carnage in Iraq, but there is also lots of good news. Visit the U.S. Embassy Web site at to get accurate, up-to-date facts.


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